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PROPERTY, AND THE COLLECTIVE
ACTION PROBLEM
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INTRODUCTION

Concerns about property rights are inherent in human nature. Recent experience suggests that the allocation of property
rights may have important environmental consequences, especially in the context of space exploration and development. Such
consequences, which in the context-of common property regimes
tend to be negative, can be ameliorated under a sufficiently potent centralized regulatory regime. Such regimes themselves,
however, tend to become victims of collective action problems.
In this Article, we analyze these collective action problems and
centralization issues and suggest a scheme for regulating space
resources that is likely to achieve important goals at far lower
cost while minimizing intrusiveness.
I
THE COLLECTIVE AcTiON PROBLEM

A large and important literature has extensively documented the difficulties involved in organizing any large group to
cooperate.' This is known as the collective action problem-a
problem that is ubiquitous in social and economic life. Consider,
for example, legislation that subsidizes only one small group,
such as a group of sheep farmers whose sheep produce a certain
rare type of wool. While the subsidy is expensive in general, its
* Robert P. Merges is the Wilson, Sonsini Professor of Law and Technology, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at Berkeley. J.D., 1985,
Yale Law School; B.A., 1981, Carnegie-Mellon University.
Glenn H. Reynolds is Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. J.D.,
1985, Yale Law School; B.A., 1982, University of Tennessee. Co-author, with
Prof. Merges, of GLENN REYNOLDs & ROBERT MERGES, OLrrER SPACE:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY (1997).
1 See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared

Freshwater: The Challenges of InternationalWater Resources Law, 90 AM. J.

384,388 (1996); Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self Enforcing Model of CorporateLaw, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1911 (1996).
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high cost is spread over a broad group of taxpayers. It is easy for
the sheep farmers to identify each other, form a lobbying group,
and articulate a clear goal-maximizing the subsidy for this type
of wool. In contrast, taxpayers in general each suffer only a slight
economic harm due to the special wool-protecting legislation. As
a consequence, although it is rational for taxpayers to oppose the
legislation in principle, as not cost-justified, they almost surely
will fail to do so because it is simply not worth the cost of organizing such opposition. The taxpayers, in other words, are
likely to be unable to overcome the collective action problem
facing them.2 The same process has already been documented in
the brief history of the U.S. space program.3 Difficulties have
arisen in efforts to acquire funding and garner legislative support
and encouragement for important space initiatives, such as the
space telescope. Because the benefits of advances in space technology and information are spread thinly over a broad constituency, marshalling forces to achieve these goals has been
4
problematic.
II
INSTITUTIONAL CENTRALIZATION OF
RESOURCE ALLOCATION

In an attempt to overcome the collective action problems
facing the space program, mechanisms have been proposed that
attempt to allocate space resources and coordinate interests
through a centralized agency. 5 Centralization solves a number of
problems, most notably eliminating the transaction costs of locating rights owners and determining the rules of ownership and
transfer. These proposals, however, overlook a difficult ques-

tion-how to rouse the various nations and fractious forces
within them to organize into a unified group. These proposals
assume an international organization to administer space rights
2 MANCUR OLSON, THE LocC OF CoLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (2d ed. 1971).
3 See HOWARD E. McCuRDY, THE SPACE STATION DECISION: INCREMENTAL POLITCS AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHOICE (1990); ROBERT W. SMITH, THE
SPACE TELESCOPE: A STUDY OF NASA, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & POLITICS

(1989).

4 See SMITH, supra note 3.
5 Cf Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing

Environmental Federalism, 95 MIcH. L.
REv. 570, 581 (1996) (noting the problem of the commons as a rationale for
federal environmental regulation).
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and proceed directly to a discussion of how best to structure the
organization without considering how such an organization might
actually come into existence.
Similar difficulties of unification may confront those who try
to organize an outer space resource allocation organization. As
attempts at multilateral coordination have demonstrated, it is difficult to get diverse nations together to agree on basic principles
and procedures. 6 This is especially true where there is considerable uncertainty over the future value of the activity being organized, as is the case with many space resources whose values are
yet to be determined. It is natural for the parties to such negotiations to try to influence the structure of the resulting organization in a manner that reflects both their current and anticipated
interests. 7 Since space exploration is an area with high future uncertainty, coordination efforts in this field are likely to face
difficulties.
Multilateral attempts at coordinated development often end
in impasses. 8 Some of these coordination problems result from
differences between industrialized nations and less developed
countries. Barbara Heim points out three areas with potential as
sources of mineral deposits (Antarctica, outer space, and the
deep seabed) all share two fundamental problems that have frustrated agreement between industrialized countries and less developed countries. 9 One problem is the ability to determine a clear

6

Cf. Edwin W. Paxson I, Note, Sharing the Benefits of Outer Space Ex-

ploration: Space Law and Economic Development, 14 MICH. J. INTL L 487,
509-10 (1993) (discussing the difficulties in creating an intergovernmental or-

ganization to govern the Moon Agreement and citing the problems in negotiating the Law of the Sea Convention as a prime example).
7 See DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
EcoNoMIc GROWTH (1990) (pointing out that institutional change always
brings an opportunity for specific groups to capture more economic rents, and
thus that some beneficial change does not take place because other groups
know this and fear it). See also Paxson, supra note 6, at 509-13 (arguing the

improbability of establishing various types of international regimes for space
development).
8 See, e.g., Barbara Ellen Heim, Exploring the Last Frontiersfor Mineral
Resources: A Comparison of InternationalLaw Regarding the Deep Seabed,
Outer Space, and Antarctica, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 819 (1990); David A.
Wirth, Public Participationin International Processes: Environmental Case
Studies at the National and InternationalLevels, 7 CoLO. J. INT'L ENVmL. I- &
POL'Y 1 (1996).
9 Heim, supra note 8, at 845-48.
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definition of the common heritage principle.10 The second problem is the lack of a workable management regime, which has impeded cooperation among the countries. Although Heim
-suggests that adversaries may compromise and find a solution
quickly, her own research illustrates there is little real hope they
will do so. 1 Heim argues that a regime should be structured so
that both developing countries and wealthy, technologically advanced countries will ratify under a one-nation, one-vote system:
"Preferably this system will provide immediate gains and control
of development to the countries or entities that take the initial
risks and will provide the developing countries with a future opportunity to take part in either the development or conservation
12
of the areas.
Yet, Heim gives no indication of any recent precedent indicating that such a scheme would have any chance of being created. In fact, recent evidence indicates that countries are only
too willing -to take advantage of existing institutions to further
self-interested goals. This trend is especially clear in the space
field. A recent article describes how the nation of Tonga successfully acquired six valuable orbital slots through the ITU allocation process, over the objection of INTELSAT. 13 The author
argues that Tonga's actions will affect the satellite telecommuni10 Although there is no single definition of the theory, the common heritage
principle generally recognizes that "(1) the area under consideration cannot be
subject to appropriation; (2) all countries must share in management of the resources; (3) there must be an active sharing of the benefits derived from exploitation of the resources; (4) the area must be dedicated exclusively to
peaceful purpose; and (5) the area must be preserved for future generations."
Id. at 827.
11For instance, she points out that problems exist where developing coun.
tries are given ultimate control over developed country activities, even though
the latter group will bear the risks of development at least in the early years.
Id. at 846.
12 Id.
13 Jonathan Ira Ezor, Costs Overhead: Tonga's Claiming of Sixteen Geostationary OrbitalSites and the Implicationsfor U.S. Space Policy, 24 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 915 (1993). The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is
the U.N. supervised arbiter of telecommunications conflicts. Id. at 918. INTELSAT is a "multinational organization whose stated purpose is 'to develop
and operate the space segment of a global commercial telecommunications satellite system."' Id. at 924. INTELSAT is a public service organization,
designed to coordinate international communications efforts. Id. From 1988 to
1990, Tonga submitted filings for sixteen geostationary orbit sites over the Pacific Ocean. Five of INTELSAT's member countries protested to the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB), claiming that the acquisition was
"for profit only and.., not designed to further the purposes of the IFRB ....
"
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cations market and pricing structure, and may even influence the
identities of the players in the satellite area. The author concludes that this incident should serve as a wake-up call to the
United States in particular, which has until now neglected to
monitor the allocation process as carefully as it should have.
.Even if a centralized institution could be created, rational
economic agents can be expected to spend significant sums of
money to influence the rights-allocation process. The general nature of such expenditures, as well as the payoffs from them, are
familiar to students of administrative agencies responsible for
doling out economically valuable rights. For example, consider
the vast sums expended to influence the awarding of defense
contracts, or government computer processing services contracts.
It is wise whenever possible to avoid these expenditures and instead encourage activities that are more directly productive.
Thus, even though one must acknowledge that there might
be significant advantages to convening a centralized agency to
administer rights to outer space resources, it may be practically
impossible to achieve consensus on the specific form such an
agency will take. It may turn out to be wasteful to encourage the
expenditure of resources on the rights-allocation process, given
that total expenditures for all space-related activities are limited.
m
OTHER RESOURCE ALLOCATION METHODS

An interesting question arises whether something short of a
centralized administrative agency might emerge (or be agreed
upon) to perform some of the same functions in allocating space
resources. Institutions of social control, after all, run the gamut
from large, formalized agencies to local authorities with common
law rules that emerge from isolated disputes over time, and even
to informal, nonlegal norms of acceptable and unacceptable conduct.14 With the caveat that any discussion of such intermediate
rules is necessarily speculative, it is useful to explore a few
possibilities.
The first possibility is that something less than full international agreement might join together most of the important
space-faring nations. For example, an entity such as a "European
Id. A compromise was eventually reached by which Tonga retained six of the

requested slots and relinquished the other ten. Id. at 915-16.
14

See, e.g.,

ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER ,Vrrour LAW

(1991).
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Economic Community" for space might be feasible. Once such
an institution were up and running, other countries would be
likely to join as well. This would certainly be likely if membership in the institution were seen as conferring significant benefits
such as stability and predictability in the definition and exchange
of property rights. New members would "opt in" to avail themselves of these benefits, and the institution would, over time, establish itself as the standard. Alternatively, of course, there
exists the possibility of competing groups, some in the system
and others outside it, either as non-affiliates or members of a rival group. This is conceivable in the realm of space, but the possibility for conflict under such circumstances would certainly be
present. Indeed, it is not hard to imagine a war under this scenario; it certainly matches to some extent the conditions that created conflicts among rival European powers in the then-newly
exploited North American colonies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 15
A second possibility is that some purely national law will
emerge as a standard, or at least as a model for other countries to
follow. In other legal areas, national leaders have effectively established patterns that have been followed by other countries:
commercial law in the United States (as seen in the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods) and patent
law in Great Britain come to mind. Similarly, in the space context, other countries could adopt the basic framework devised in
the pioneer country Alternatively, private entities could specifically "opt into" coverage under the pioneer country's laws-for
example, by choice of law provisions in private contracts. This
scenario is obviously more likely when a single country dominates the industry, as experience shows that legal frameworks
often are generated in this way. The effect would be somewhat
similar to the limited-membership group just described, with a
jurisdictionally limited legal regime emerging as the de facto international standard.
A third possibility is that the space industry will settle on a
set of informal rules or norms that govern their activities. This is
the case in some fields, such as the diamond industry, where disputes are very rarely referred to formal legal institutions such as
courts, but are instead resolved by respected industry members
15 See MERLE

EUGENE CURTI ET AL., AN AMERICAN HIsToRY

(1950).
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according to well-understood and agreed-upon norms. 16 It
should be noted, however, that arrangements such as these are
usually stable only in small, closely-knit societies, where nonlegal
sanctions such as negative gossip or reduced standing in a common religious or ethnic community are effective disincentives to
rulebreaking. 17 Since the parallels between such small, closed societies and the "society" of international space commerce are
limited, it is not clear how far shared norms can be expected to
carry the international space industry toward stable legal
relations.
Lawrence D. Roberts puts forward an argument for non-formal norms to govern space activities. 18 Roberts argues that the
unique "gravity-neutral" areas around the Moon and Earth
known as the Lagrange Points could be ,governed by what he
calls the "traditional Law of the Commons," which maximizes
.efficiency and equity without incurring substantial transaction
costs.19 According to Roberts, three main features of the "Law
of the Commons" as applied to space resources are: (1) sovereignty is invested in no specific user, but all users are entitled not
only to freedom of access but also freedom of use regulated
within a strict code of conduct; ° (2) rights are granted only to
those entities that exploit the resource; 2 ' and (3) because several
of the Lagrange Points tend to draw objects toward their centers,
creating a high danger of collision, preventative measures (such
as placing competing orbital facilities in physical contact) or dispute resolution (such as pre-agreed, binding arbitration) might
16 See, &g., Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 L. & Soc'y REv. 719,
721 (1973); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: ExtralegalContractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LErAL STUD. 115, 138-43 (1992).
17 See Janet T-Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogenous Middleman
Group: An InstitutionalAlternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349
(1981); Douglas NV. Allen & Dean Lueck, The "Back Forty" on a Handshake:
Specific Assets, Reputation, and the Structure of Farmland Contracts, 8 J.L
EcoN. & ORG. BEHAV. 366, 369-70 (1992); GLENN G. STEVENSON, COM.MON
PROPERTY ECONOICS: A GENERAL THEORY AND LAND USE APPuCATIONS
(1991); MAKING THE COMMONS WORK (Daniel Bromley ed., 1992); ELINOR OS.

TROm, GOVERNING THE COMIZONS (1991); ELLICKSON, supra note 14.

18 Lawrence D. Roberts, Tire Law of tie Commons: A Framework for tie
Efficient and Equitable Use of tire Lagrange Points, 6 CONN. J. INTrL L 151
(1990).
19 Id.at 154..
20 1d. at 166.
21 Id. at 167.
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be necessary as the community grows. 22 Since there are only a
few Lagrange Points, those states exploiting their benefits may
develop a micro-society that more closely parallels a closely-knit
society such as the diamond industry than the whole international society of space exploration, making non-formal norms or
rules more plausible in the context of the Lagrange Points.23
IV
ALTERNATIVES TO CENTRALIZED
RIGHTS ALLOCATION

The legal forum that applies rules is really only as effective
as the content of the rules themselves. Thus, we must return to a
discussion of which property rules make sense in the space context. The centralized agencies that are most often discussed presuppose a structure that allocates pre-existing rights on some
basis-for example, by auction. A variety of alternatives exist.
One alternative envisions an administrative structure to facilitate
trading and other exchanges of rights whose ownership is determined outside the exchange system according to a simple rule,
such as first possession. It also involves a regime to resolve disputes 'among multiple claimants.
It is difficult, and perhaps foolhardy, to specify the precise
content of property fights before the economic activity they will
cover has matured. Consider the emergence of property rights in
beaver hunting territories among native inhabitants on Labrador
in the eighteenth century. 24 Harold Demsetz argues that before
property rights emerged the expense did not justify the cost of
voluntary agreements on the optimal beaver harvest, or of enforcement of the.agreement by policing.25 This lack of a coordinated property fights system was not a problem until, as a result
of the growth in the European fur market, western traders increased the value of beaver pelts by paying more for them. At
this point the lack of coordination among the native inhabitants
22 Id. at 169-70.
23

Id. at 155.

See 1 HAROLD DEMSETZ, OWNERSHIP, CONTROL AND TIlE FIRM: Tin.
ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC AcrvrT' 107-09 (1988) (arguing that before the
advent of the fur trade made furs more valuable and increased the rate of bea24

ver hunting, property rights for beaver hunters were not necessary).
25

Id.
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became too costly to continue.26 The problem was solved by creating a system of private ownership. Under private ownership, it
is the owner who suffers due to overharvesting; since she knows
this, and, critically, since she alone controls the harvest rate, she
will adjust that rate so as to harvest only the optimal number of
beavers. That is, she will make her plot self-sustaining, if possible. The key is that she cannot foist off the negative consequences of her decisions onto the community at large; she must
internalize these externalities and hence take account of them in
her decision-making. The point is generalized in the article as
follows:
What converts a harmful or beneficial effect [e.g., the effect of
harvesting one more beaver] into an externality is that the cost
of bringing the effect to bear on the decisions of one or more
of the interacting persons is too high to make it worthwhile ...
"Internalizing" such effects refers to a process, usually a
change in property rights, that enables these effects to bear (in
greater degree) on all interacting persons. 27
The environmental implications of this statement with respect to space should be evident. Through internalization of environmental effects, the costs of these effects are borne by all
interacting parties. The Coase theorem makes a related point.2s
It states that, given some initial assignment of property rights,
those rights will be traded until they reach the hands of the highest-valuing user, regardless of who holds the rights in the first
place. It is crucial to note, however, that this model assumes low
transaction costs, an assumption that is generally not true in the
real world. The Coase theorem is most famous as applied to
legal rules; at least in its "strong" form, it implies a thought that
26

See id. at 108 (noting an "unmistakable correlation between early centers

of fur trade and the oldest and most complete development of the private hunting territory").
27 Id at 105. Yoram Barzel makes a similar statement:
People choose to exercise rights when they believe the gains from such
actions will exceed their costs. Conversely, people fail to exercise rights
when the gains from owning properties are deemed insufficient, thus placing (or leaving) such properties in the public domain. What is found in
the public domain, therefore, is what people have chosen not to claim. As
conditions change, however, something that has been considered not

worthwhile to own may be newly perceived as worthwhile; conversely,
what was at first owned may be placed in the public domain.
YoRAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 65 (1989).
28 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
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chills many a lawyer and judge-that legal rules are irrelevant, at
29
least in terms of their impact on overall output.
Applying these theoretical points to the design of a regime
for- space entails ensuring that greater specification of rights is
not precluded in the future. Although under the "strong" form
of the Coase theorem the initial allocation of rights does not matter, in practice it surely will. Transaction costs are likely to be
high, at least where rights holders are widely dispersed and the
value of rights is subject to a great deal of imprecision. Such is
the case with space exploration, with its international scope and
high future uncertainty. *If, for instance, space minerals are discovered that were not known at the time rights were initially allocated, it may be practically difficult for a company that is wellpositioned to take advantage of the new mineral to locate and
bargain with all rights holders whose permission must be obtained. The system of property rights must be designed with this
sort of future contingency in mind. Yet, it must also be uniform
enough to create settled expectations? 0 For present purposes, it
is important to keep in mind that the initial allocation of rights
will be subject to subsequent refinements-and, as a consequence, subsequent transactions-and to design it 'accordingly.
Still, an overarching goal should be to ensure that individuals and
entities bear a significant share of the environmental costs, as
well as the economic benefits, that their activity creates.
This emphasis on future flexibility and reduction of externalities does not preclude any of the models of rights allocation
mentioned so far. Certainly the international rights "condominium" could be founded with the principle of future flexibility in
mind. On the other hand, if flexibility is the most important attribute of the system, it must be conceded that a centralized administration is not the only system that will work. If there are
costs to such a system-for example, as argued above, the costs
of activities designed to influence the allocation and content of
rights (in other words, "rent seeking" costs)-then alternatives
29 See Robert D. Cooter, The Coase Theorem, in 1 T1E NEw PALGRAVE: A
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 457-60 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987). See also
Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE W. 1315, 1337-41 (1993)
(noting that assignment of private land plots greatly increased agricultural productivity in the, earliest colonies).
30 See Ellickson, supra note 29, at 1362 ("A group that is willing to recognize
private property in land must decide what standard bundle of rights to confer
on a meritorious occupier of a part of its territory.").
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that provide the same flexibility without these costs must be explored. We turn to this task in the following section.
V
MODIFIED FIRST POSSESSION AND DEED REGISTRY

As

AN ALTERNATIVE

Economic theory in general does not look favorably upon a
rule of first possession, at least in the terrestrial context. 31 Most
economists who have considered the question agree that "squatting," as well as the various forms of "homesteading" that were
used to settle the American West in the nineteenth century,
probably encouraged people to enter the land earlier than they
would have under a system of competitive bidding.32 Aside from
the assumptions inherent in the economic models used (for example, the assumption of complete information concerning future activities on and therefore the value of the land), this
consensus view makes a realistic point: the race to possess free
(or nearly free) land can be expected to pull resources out of
other productive uses at a faster rate than may be optimal.3 3 Importantly, what empirical evidence there is on the topic seems to
support this view: the failure rate among farms started on cheap
(in other words, "underpriced") homestead lands appears to
have been significantly higher than it was on other farms 4
Other historical sources support the same point:
[I]nnumerable tumults must have arisen, and the good order
of the world been continually broken and disturbed, while a
variety of persons were striving who should get the first occupation of the same thing, or disputing which of them had actu35
ally gained it.
31

See Dean Lueck, The Rule of FirstPossession and the Design of the Law,

38 J.L. & EcoN. 393 (1995).
32 Id. at 414-16.

33 One branch of economics has consistently concluded that goods whose
prices are regulated will come to be rationed by a combination of price and
non-price "expenditures," for example, waiting in line, that are always less efficient than allocation by price alone. See BARZEL, supra note 27.
34 See, e.g., R. Taylor Dennen, Some Efficiency Effects of Nineteenth-Centur,
Federal Land Policy: A Dynamic Analysis, 51 AGric. HisT. 718, 734 (1977).

See also Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, The Race for Property Rights, 33
J.L. & ECON. 177 (1990); David D. Haddock, FirstPossession Versus Optimal
71ning: Limiting the Dissipation of Economic Value, 64 VAsH. U. L.Q. 775

(1986).
35 2 WLLAM BLACKsToNE, CormrNTmEs *4.
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In the face of this theory, how can anyone oppose a centralized ights-allocation authority to auction space rights? In a
sense, the answer is no one, at least so long as the rather optimistic assumptions underlying the theory hold true. But this ignores
an important point. As mentioned earlier, the forces that will be
called upon to form this authority go beyond-and in many ways,
can be expected to be inconsistent with-the forces of reason in
support of efficient space development.
In short, politics will enter the picture. .When this happens,
the efficient auction mechanism could be transformed into a bureaucratic monster. In the international arena where space issues
arise, great potential exists for bureaucratic nightmares. To some
extent, an approximation of the ideal solution may be worse than
a different solution entirely-a classic case of the "theory of the
second best. '36 Thus, although considerable centralized authority is necessary for the efficient auction schemes mentioned here,
it should be recognized that strong centralized authority could be
far from efficient if used for more than rights auctions. The fall
of the Soviet Union and many Eastern European governments
represents the only evidence that need be cited here.
At the same time, history also teaches that pure anarchy has
its costs as well. Indeed, an analysis of the emergence of informal (or, perhaps better, quasi-formal) property rights among
gold miners in the lawless (in other words, "state-less") gold mining country of California in the 1850s recapitulates a story that
must have been common in pre-history: the gold miners discovered that it was cheaper to respect certain rights than to fend off
usurpers. In a lawless regime, in other words, they found that
too much effort was devoted to physical defense of a claim, leaving too little time and effort to actually develop it. They consequently formulated a classic Hobbesian bargain where power was
ceded to some "authority" for definition and protection of rights,
resulting in more stable claims and therefore more efficient eco-

36

Professor Leff described the "theory of the second best" as follows:
[I]n complex processes.., a move in the right direction is not necessarily
the right move. To pick a simple illustration, if I am on a desert island,
subsisting solely on cocoanuts [sic] and oysters and beginning to hate it a
lot, and across the bay from me there is another island, lush and fertile, I

do not improve my position in life by swimming half way across.
Arthur A. Leff, EconomicAnalysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism,
60 VA. L. REv. 451, 476 (1974).
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nomic production 3 7 Despite the technological advances since
the 1850s, defense of space claims presents problems of time, effort, and expense. It is hoped that explorers and developers of
space resources will not repeat the experience of the early gold
miners. If they fail to institute some minimalist state in the early
days of space industry, however, they surely will.
What is needed, then, is arguably a simple rule for allocating
space property rights, together with something akin to the semicentralized, fairly minimal system of deed registries that flourishes in many countries. This system has the benefit of simplicity
and ease of administration, yet includes sufficient coordination to
make property transactions feasible. Both parts of this "minimalist proposal" will be explored in the sections that follow: the
first possession rule of title acquisition, and the deed registry system for claims.
VI
WHY FIRST POSSESSION?

As indicated above, first possession is often a poor way to
allocate property. Nevertheless, three factors make it attractive
in the space context.
First, allocation by first possession is simple and requires
very little government involvement. Aside from a method of recording claims and some threat or sanction to deter stronger second-comers from displacing rightful first possessors (discussed
below), very little in the way of governmental authority is
38
needed.
Second, its theoretical defect-too-rapid developmentmay be a needed countermeasure when people are (inefficiently)
risk averse, which is almost certainly the case regarding spacerelated investment, 39 and when important non-economic goals
are also served by development. Given the reality of weapons of
mass destruction and environmental threats on earth, it is plausible to assert that encouraging space development might be a
37 See JOHN R. UrmECK, A THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS VITH APPLiCA.
TION TO THE CALIFORNIA GOLD RUSH (1981).
38 See Richard Epstein, Possession as the Root of 71tle, 13 GA. L REv. 1221

(1979).
39 See Heidi Keefe, Making ate Final FrontierFeasible. A CriticalLook at
the Current Body of Outer Space Law, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIOH
TEcH. LJ.345, 361-71 (1995).
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good insurance policy for the survival'of the species. 40 If special
incentives are needed which might be viewed as excessive from
the limited perspective of maximizing current expected net
profit, then they may well be justified in light of the importance
of this overriding goal.
Finally, while the first possession method of land allocation
dissipated frontier land values, it economized on enforcement
costs in establishing land rights. 41 Yet, the dissipation of frontier
land values itself probably constituted non-trivial economic
waste. In space, however, inefficient races to claim and develop
space resources will come with a significant spillover benefit: the
development of more rapid and more diverse space exploration
vehicles. This is a very important difference from the land development analogies, where racing depletes fixed resources in the
context of largely static technologies. In much the same way that
society encourages technical progress through what might be described as "racing for patents," on the belief that the spillovers to
society exceed the costs of racing, it should consider encouraging
a.race ever deeper into space.42
Robert Ellickson has written that "[i]ndividual ownership
...generate[s] some new transaction costs, mainly those arising
' 43
from the proliferation of boundaries and ownership entities"
For this reason, private ownership, at least where population
growth begins to cause some degree of crowding, entails the creation of a system for proving title claims and keeping them
straight-a deed registry. 44 Note, however, that Ellickson provides an-interesting prediction applicable to the space context:
The efficiency thesis predicts that innovations in technologies
for marking, defending, and proving boundaries lead to more
parcelization because they reduce the transaction costs of private property regimes. According to this view, for example,
Glidden's invention of barbed wire in 1874 should have stimu40 See David Everett Marko, A Kindler, Gentler Moon Treaty: A Critical
Review of the Current Moon Treaty and a Proposed Alternative, 8 J. NAT. RE.
SOURCES & Er vTL. L. 293, 325-26 (1992-93).
41 Lueck, supra note 31, at 414-15.
42 Cf Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics
of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. Rv. 839 (1990) (criticizing economists' patent
race models along these lines).
Ellickson, supra note 29, at 1329.
44 See, e.g., George L. Haskins, The Beginning of the Recording System in
43

Massachusetts, 21 B.U. L. Rv. 281 (1941) (discussing earliest colonial recording systems).
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lated more subdivision of rangeland in the American West.
And this indeed appears to have occurred. 45

According to this hypothesis, which is simply that legal rules
maximize overall efficiency in closely-knit societies, property
boundaries in space are important enough that we can expect innovations in the technology of marking, defining, and recording
them, so that over time the task of keeping track of claims becomes cheaper and easier.
VII
POTENTIAL PITFALLS OF FIRST POSSESSION, AND
SOME MODEST SUGGESTIONS ON
HOW TO AVOID THEM

At the outset, we must clarify precisely what interest we intend to perfect via possession; that is, what content we will assign
to the "bundle of rights" 46 obtained by first possession. In western legal systems, the variety of property rights is vast, but one
basic distinction can be used to separate rights into two broad
classes. This is the distinction between the usufruct, a right to
continued use for a limited time, and the fee, a more permanent
interest that can be traded, devised, or otherwise transferred.
For some purposes, the usufruct may prove to be valuable in the
space environment, but generally we have in mind a fee interest,
more specifically a right akin to the fee simple of Anglo-American law.47 The fee interest has the advantages of predictability
(given the thousand-plus year history of these interests) and flexibility which, as mentioned earlier, is a key advantage given our
current lack of knowledge about the full range of resources that
may be encountered in space.
Second, we need to clarify what we mean by "possession."
This is important for more than definitional reasons: ignored in
our discussion up until now has been the problem of overclaiming. If possession is defined too loosely (for example, the apocryphal "Iclaim this continent for Spain"), then the first visitors or
inhabitants in a given area of space would have almost limitless
Ellickson, supra note 29, at 1330.
Property rights are often viewed as a "bundle." See J.E. Penner, The
"Bwzdle of Rights" Picture of Property,43 UCLA L. REv. 711 (1996).
47 For further explanation of the basic features of Anglo-American fee simple,see Roger NV. Anderson, Presentand Future Interests: A GraphicErplanation, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 101, 104 (1995).
45
46
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rights. But a narrow definition could cause other problems. For
example, if a certain mineral is distributed unevenly in various
extraterrestrial rock formations, it may be difficult to predict how
wide an area must be claimed to ensure a viable mining operation. Limiting the definition of possession unduly must necessarily create uncertainty under these circumstances.
The solution to the problem will come in two parts, one theoretical and the other empirical. The theoretical portion entails
placing some "reasonable" limits on the geographic scope of
claims. This is the rationale behind a number of provisions in
other regimes where property rights are defined. Patent law,
with its explicit attention to claim scope, comes most readily to
mind. 48 Indeed, the theoretical rationale for the tradeoff between adequate property rights to spur investment and excessive
property rights that concentrate an inefficient degree of control
in a single pair of hands (and hence slow down those who follow)
has been described at length. 49 But other property regimes have
arrived at similar schemes. The law of gold mining, for example,
limits the size of individual claims, requires claims to be recorded
and surveyed, requires them to be perfected by some minimum
investment of time and/or labor, and causes them to be forfeit for
failure to perform any of these requirements.50 In his study on
the evolution of property rights among prospectors during the
California Gold Rush, John Umbeck observes that even the earliest contracts establishing such rights included limitations on
claim size and minimum working requirements.-S So the theoretical point is straightforward: rights must be limited to prevent
overclaiming. 52 The costs of paying off extortionate claim holders would add too much to an already uncertain enterprise. This
is true in the space context as well.
The empirical point is simpler to make, but harder to implement. The "reasonable" scope of rights will have to be arrived at
over time. It may vary from one region or type of resource to
48

See Merges & Nelson, supra note 42.

49

See id.

See Comment, The GeneralMining Law and the Doctrine of Pedis Possessio: The Case for CongressionalAction, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 1026 (1982).
50

51 UMBECK,

supra note 37.

Arguably we should not be worried about granting rights that are "too
broad." If a third party is in a better position to exploit the rights than thp
original rightholder, the two should strike a deal. Perhaps the concern stems
from the costs involved in striking and enforcing these deals.
52
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another and it may be subject to refinement and revision over
time. But, ultimately, it will have to be decided not upon the
premises of theory, but on the accretion of experience.' The concept of property rights in space is far newer than rights in terrestrial tangible property such as gold or intangible property such as
patents or copyrights. We have far more information regarding
terrestrial property rights on which to base theory than we have
regarding the unique problems posed by propert rights in space.
Finally, some technology for indicating possession and marking the boundaries of claims will be necessary.5 3 Ideally,
whatever devices are used for this purpose would be coordinated
with a "deed registry" on Earth, so that the positions of boundaries could be confirmed remotely from the registry office. Given
the advent of (terrestrial) global positioning technology,5 it is
realistic to anticipate such a technology. It certainly would have
the benefit of reducing the cost of establishing and enforcing
claims, which should make it an attractive technology to develop.
Like the development of barbed wire on the American frontier,
such demarcation technologies can have significant overall benefits. Indeed, these potential benefits may well be sizeable enough
that the U.S. government might consider investing funds in research to develop such a technology at the outset of space development activities.
VIII
SETTING ASIDE PRESERVED AREAS

The preceding discussion has quietly trumpeted the virtues
of private property. It has pushed aside the concerns of those
who back the application of the common heritage principle to
space development. We must admit one troubling aspect of our
analysis, however. Although in theory developing nations vill
bid on space resources when they have attained the economic
wherewithal to exploit such resources, and granting rights to

these nations before this time would be inefficient, there are reasons to believe that some system of "development preserves"
would make sense, perhaps totaling ten percent of the area capable of development. For one thing, an argument akin to "intergenerational equity"' can be made for giving developing
53 See Ellickson, supra note 29.
54 See Comment, Global Positioning System (GPS): Defining dhe Legal Issues of its Expanding Civil Use, 61 J. AIR L. & CoM. 243 (1995).
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countries some opportunity to exploit near-earth resources well
after the initial development period by advanced 'nations has
passed. For another, it makes good political sense since it will
give developing countries a greater stake in peaceful space development, and perhaps even bring them more readily into an international regime to recognize property rights in the first place,
rather than encouraging them to adopt the role of spoilers. 55
In addition to development preserves, there should be environmental research and conservation preserves. Perhaps ten to
fifteen percent of the area capable of being developed ought to
be preserved for this purpose, though the size and character of
such preserves may depend in part on the specific resources in
question. If preserves are built into the development scheme
from the beginning, many of the problems of terrestrial environmental preservation can be .avoided. If it turns out over some
suitably long period of time that little interest is expressed in the
preserved areas, then they can be auctioned off or given to developing countries.
Preserves would be established and maintained by the same
recording authority that keeps title records, arranges transfers,
and the like. One possible way to enforce the boundaries of preserves would be to give a bounty to any party who discovers encroachment on preserve lands-for instance, in the form of a
grant of title over some moderately large claim. This would create an incentive for enforcement without the need for the enforcing authority to have an extensive presence in the area. The
basic point, however, is that preserved space for future development and pure conservation should be built into the space property regime at the outset, to avoid the cost and political
difficulties of creating such preserves after property becomes valuable. Of course, if possession plus adherence to some minimal
formalities are recognized as the international standard for securing a claim, all spacefaring nations must be made to agree to recognize preserves and abide by their boundaries. Initially, this
should not be too difficult on a practical level, since the number
of spacefaring nations will be small. Over time, a simple mechanism may come to be used to ensure multilateral recognition of
55 For arguments along these lines, see Paxson, supra note 6. Paxsonargues
that a regime to use lunar mining, involving transferable credits based on a
nation's population and allowing mining for only finite periods, would beneflt

developing countries and therefore merits investigation.
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preserves-for example, a rule that claims will not be enforced if
made by a national of a country that does not recognize the legitimacy of preserves, or that has permitted incursions into them by
claimants.
CONCLUSION

The waning of enthusiasm for common heritage schemes in
the space context poses a challenge for space law, and for space
development enthusiasts: the challenge of coming up with something that addresses the most important concerns motivating
"common heritage" proposals without embodying the statist and
anti-market character that such proposals tend to share. Properly crafted, property rights approaches are likely to be lower in
cost, and better at protecting the environment, than are centralized bureaucratic regimes. We have suggested some considerations involved in applying property rights to space resource
development. We hope that others will join in the conversation.
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